

Introduction to My Memoirs

GENERAL GLOBACHEV

I must state that I had absolutely no intention of setting forth a history of the Russian Revolution in making these memoirs available to the public, nor to examine in any broad terms the reasons behind this pernicious event. This is too complex a task at the present time and will be the lot of a future dispassionate historian. I only wanted to present this information, which with other material might serve in the drafting of such a history.

As someone who was close to senior government officials, and by the nature of my work having direct contact with various sectors of the population, I was able to communicate with various people, and to observe and note that which might escape the attention of an ordinary citizen or a person of little experience in internal political affairs. Many minor items have slipped from my memory because years have passed since the time that these events took place, but everything that deals with the characteristics of political figures and the character and meaning of events themselves have remained fresh in my memory. I greatly regret that there is much for which I cannot offer documented evidence, because all records of the Security Bureau, as well as my personal belongings, were either burned, pillaged, or fell into the hands of the new revolutionary authorities during the early days of the riots.

Over a two-year period I was witness to the preparation of the riots against the sovereign power, unstoppable by anyone, bringing Russia to unprecedented shock and destruction. I use the word “riot” and not “revolution” because the Russian populace had not yet “ripened” for revolution and because the masses, in general, did not participate in the overthrow. In fact, what is essential to the very essence of revolution is an idea. If we look at history, we will see that revolutions take place under the influence of some sort of idea taking hold

of the breadth of the populace. For the most part, these ideas are patriotic-nationalistic. Was there an idea among the leadership of the Russian Revolution? There was, if we can call ambition and self-interest of the leaders—whose sole purpose was to grab power, at whatever cost—an idea.

Russia was engaged in a colossal war. It would seem that for its successful conclusion it would have been necessary to exert all of its strength, forgetting all of one's personal interests and bringing everything in sacrifice to the fatherland, remembering that, before all else, it was necessary to win the war, and only afterward to be occupied with domestic matters. Meanwhile what did the cream of the crop of our intelligentsia do? With the very first military misfortune, it tried to undermine the people's faith in sovereign authority and the government. Not only that, but it tried to lower the prestige of the bearer of sovereign authority in the eyes of the masses, accusing him from a platform of People's Representatives, now of government betrayal, now of immoral dissolution. The State Duma—the representative organ of the nation—became an agitating tribunal revolutionizing the nation. These People's Representatives, to whom all of Russia listened, decided without considering the consequences to incite the masses on the eve of the turning point of military fortunes on the front, exclusively for the purpose of satisfying their own ambitions. Was there a patriotic idea here? On the contrary, the essence of all the activities of these people was betrayal of the government. History has no examples of a similar betrayal. All of the activity of the Socialists and Bolsheviks that followed in the dismantling of Russia was only the logical aftermath of the betrayal by those traitors who planned the overthrow, and the last of these is less to blame than the first. They were right in their own way; they wanted to transform the government and the social order in Russia according to their program, which was the ultimate goal of their many years of work and dreams, cherished by every kind of socialist. This was the realization of their ideology.

The Russian intelligentsia should have learned from other governments that were involved in the war, where notwithstanding their difficult ordeals and class struggles, they closed ranks behind their governments and forgot their domestic feuds, and all personal interests were sacrificed for the common good where everything was risked to achieve one cherished goal—defeat of the enemy. Everybody worked in the name of a national idea. In Russia they worked to the advantage of the enemy, trying as much as possible to pull down the army and tear down the powerful monarchy. If the Central Powers presented a united front against Russia, they had an ally among the leaders of the intelligentsia who constituted a united domestic front to besiege our army's rear. The work of this internal enemy was carried out methodically over

a two-year period, taking advantage of every misfortune, every mistake, and every event or occurrence at this time.

Special organizations were created that were supposedly subsidiary governmental agencies whose purpose was the successful conduct of the war, but in reality their intentions were solely to eat away at the government and army from inside. Even in establishments in the capital, they tried to foment discontent and opposition to the established order. Everything was used: false rumors, libel in the newspapers, the tough economic times, influence on the working masses, underground revolutionary movements, discord among government officials, personal intrigues, and other tactics. In short, everything was set in motion to create a revolutionary atmosphere so that there would not be a single defender of the old order once the banner of the revolutionary center was raised. The government, in its weakness, unwittingly played into the hands of its adversary, unable to bring forth a single individual from among its own who could at least be talented and firm in political action and capable of stopping this evil matter. So, the awful Russian revolution began, and its nightmarish consequences continue to this day, and nobody knows when this will end.

The Russian people often rebelled during Russia's thousand-year history, in each case egged on by traitors who deceived them. Let us recall "The Time of Troubles" and "The Streltsy Uprising," which were brought about by Boyar sedition, "the Stenka Razin insurrection," "Pugachev's Rebellion," and the Decembrist revolt. In all these instances, traitors to Russia deceived the masses. Relatively recently, in 1902, during the agrarian disturbances in Ukraine, agents of revolutionary committees incited peasants against landowners by spreading false rumors of a supposed royal decree that allowed peasants to take the land and property from landowners—and the peasants believed this. This serves to demonstrate that the Russian people were capable of insurrection, but not revolution. It was the same in the 1917 revolution; the people were deceived by the alleged oncoming famine; they shouted, "Give us bread," but nobody cried out "down with Nicholas" or "down with the Tsar." Did Rodzianko or Alekseev inform the Tsar of this? I do not know, but I think not. In addition, if the Tsar had abdicated and someone had been found who was capable of suppressing the February nightmare, nobody would have called it a revolution, but simply an insurrection of the Petrograd garrison.

We could more easily call the events of 1905, after the unfortunate war with Japan, a revolution rather than an uprising. This revolution was caused by extremists who used displeasure with the war's misfortunes as the foundation of a national idea that the monarchy had lost its prestige as a great power. In the defense of national interests, a new power needed to emerge—a national

power capable of restoring Russia's former greatness and giving the country a new order that would provide a robust national life instead of an incompetent outmoded monarchy. Thus, the revolution of 1905 moved and grew under the banners that were founded on national patriotism.

I will not stick to a chronological order in my memoirs, but I will pause on those events, occurrences, and individuals that stand out as phases in the preparation of the February uprising of 1917, the prior two years, and the subsequent development of the Russian Revolution.